Abstract: This paper presents a case study of constitution making process within a very divided society. The aim is to assess weight of variables such as external and internal constraints, individual, institutional and group interests and perceptions in the failure of constitution making processes that take place in very divided society. To study the question, the paper takes Israel as a case study, a very deeply divided society with some component of consociative regime where the few attempts to write a constitution have failed, making Israel a unique case of democracy without a formal constitution.
Introduction
Most democracies' legislatures and government are required to act under and within constitutional documents. Although a Constitution was intended to be written in the first years of statehood, the country still lacks a formal constitutional document -either written or unwritten. Instead, Israel possesses quasi-constitutional texts framing the political the external constraint imposed by the UN resolution compelling Israel to draft a Constitution 4 but also to the wish to mark a rupture with the past and to stress the revolutionary feature of the state establishment (Gavison, 2003) . Hence, the declaration of Independence read by the Prime Minister Ben-Gurion stated that a "constitution […] shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1 st of October 1948". When the constituent assembly was finally elected in 1949, it was rapidly turned into a regular legislative assembly, thus giving it two functions: that of constituent assembly and that of a parliament. In 1950, after a long debate at the Knesset, a majority of the representatives decided not to write a constitution at this stage and opted instead for the progressive enactment of several Basic Laws.
The failure in the constitution making at the time has often been explained by the religious groups' opposition to the project and the secular leaders' fear to increase the religious-secular tensions (Lerner 2004 , 238, Peleg 1998 . The relations between both groups were indeed quite complex at the time. Before the state independence, a part of the religious sector, the ultra-orthodox group, had strongly opposed the establishment of a Zionist state 5 . Although the relations with the Zionist religious were less difficult, they were also marked by disputes on the question of the state identity, i.e. Jewish or secular. After decades of disputes, the secular segment reached an agreement with the religious that set up an kind of consociative system in the state to be: it granted special protections to religious activities and guaranteed the autonomy of the religious group in several fields of activities 6 (Don Yehia 2000) . This agreement known as the status quo permitted to avoid clashes between the groups and made possible the formation of coalitions between the segments during the first decades of the state. In this context, it is often assumed that the fear to reactivate the secular vs. religious conflict at the independence pushed the leaders to renounce the constitutional project.
However, a closer look at the debate that took place in the Knesset between 1949 and 1950 reveals that the fundamental causes explaining the positions toward the constitution were much more complex. First, the two camps that formed during the debate did not overlap the religious vs. secular line of division. Indeed, while the proconstitution camp was composed of secular parties both from the left -the Marxist party
Mapam-and from the right -the nationalist party Herut and the liberal party the General Zionists-, the opponents' camp included both the secular socialist party -the Mapai-and the religious segment -the Zionist religious and ultra-orthodox parties.
In fact, the main elements explaining the position seem to be related to group interests and perceptions. To understand the opposition to the Constitution, the first element to be mentioned is the perceptions and beliefs of the then Prime Minister BenGurion whose influence on the other anti-constitution camp was strong. Ben-Gurion's objection was related to three major elements. In his discourses, the Prime Minister focused on mainly ideological reasons: the fact that liberal principles were already mentioned in the Declaration of independence; the idea that drafting a Constitution should not take place at a time when only a minority of Jews had established in Israel;
and finally, he argued that a Constitution making process would deepen the rift between religious and secular (Sharfman 1993, 39) . Under the surface, other strategic elements however appear.
First, as the chair of the biggest party in the parliament, Ben-Gurion did not wish to keep the proportional electoral system that favoured the small parties and, which a constitution would have entrenched (Gavison 2003, 58) . Moreover, Ben-Gurion's main fears about the constitution that a superior legal document would limit the powers and the efficiency of its government (Sharfman 1993 , 40, Aronson 1998 , 1994 . While its party supported the constitution project during the first electoral campaign, Ben-Gurion rapidly tried and convinced its group that the postponement of the constitution was the best solution for the state and for the party (Rackman 1955, 16-18) .
The position of the religious parties that were at the time united in a single list and member of the government coalition was indirectly influenced by Ben-Gurion's arguments. Originally, the Zionist religious group did not perceive any inherently incompatibility between a constitution and their loyalty to religion (Goldberg 1998, 212) .
They in fact conceded that a brief constitution defining the regime could be useful in a new state. The non-Zionist ultra-orthodox group did not oppose the Constitution idea as a whole either. They adopted a pragmatic position and tried to exert an influence on the constitutional process in order to avoid the inclusion of the religious matters in the constitutional document (Goldberg 1998, 213) . However, when both segments understood that Ben-Gurion would oppose the constitution making, they modified their position. The Zionist religious leaders decided to support Ben-Gurion's postponement proposition while the ultra-orthodox segment shifted to a complete opposition attitude to the constitution. The ultra-orthodox shift in only two years can be explained by the leaders rational choice: when Ben-Gurion's party took position against the constitution making, it became clear that the document would not be written. Thus, by supporting the leading party's position, the religious were sure that they would be able to present a political achievement to their voters (Goldberg 1998, 215) .
On the other hand, the pro-Constitution group's position was obviously related to its minority position in the Knesset and to its semi-peripheral position in the socio-political sphere. Indeed, if the group asserted that such a document was necessary to organise relations between branches of the power and that its symbolic strength was necessary to reach national cohesion, the Constitution was above all regarded as a necessary tool to protect the liberties of the minority from the government (Sharfman 1993, 48) .
It thus appears from this that the major line of division during the original constitutional debate did not overlap the secular religious cleavage but rather a government parties vs.
non-government parties line of division, where both defended their perceived interests.
In June 1950, the debate finally brought about the vote, of a text of compromise called the Harari proposal. The text states that, "The First Knesset assigns to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee the preparation of a proposed constitution for the state. The constitution will be made up of chapters, each of which will constitute a separate Basic Law. The chapters will be brought to the Knesset, as the Committee completes its work, and all the chapters together will constitute the constitution of the state". This resolution, although it did not fully satisfy any of the political groups 7 , had the advantage that it did not sacrifice any groups' perceived or actual interests, at least in the short term. Indeed, for the pro-constitution camp, it could be seen as a first step to the enactment of a constitution, while for the anti-constitution group, the fact that it did not specify the status of the Basic Laws vis-à-vis the other laws complied with their wish that the judiciary would not interfere in the governmental activity. Finally, the religious group interest were not challenged as the status quo agreement was left intact. The first failure to write a constitution in Israel thus seems to confirm Elster's observations. Indeed, the fact the constitutional assembly was turned into a regular parliament that pursued the task to write the constitution, gave crucial significance to group interests leading to the failure of the constitutional project. Furthermore, the fact that the parliament led the process also gave important weight to institutional interests, which is reflected by two elements. On the one hand, the wish to leave the government free from judicial review led Ben-Gurion and its party to object the constitution. On the other, the compromise that was ultimately reached both guaranteed that regular laws enactment would not be restrained by a supra-constitutional text and left the Knesset a 7 The Mapam was particularly critical toward the Harari proposal because it did not specify any time limit in the constitution making as well as the communist party (Rackman, 1955) . The religious on the other hand remained on their anti-constitution stand and abstained from voting the law (Goldberg, 1998) . These demands can be seen as the result of socio-political developments that were at work since a decade and more specifically of the religious groups' evolution. Since 1967, the cleavage between secular left and religious had increased considerably partly due to the ideological positioning of the latter on the "territorial issues" (Hazan 2000, 126) . In 1977, after 30 years of Labour-led government in collaboration with religious parties, the right-wing party Likud took power, hence turning the dominant party system into a bipolarised political system. Paradoxically, this new political configuration increased the power of religious political parties, which suddenly became the core of a battle between both large parties to form a coalition government. As a consequence, religious parties took advantage of their black mail potential to radicalise their demands generating the paralysis of coalition making and government (Bogdanor 1993) . In this context, secular parties and academic groups pushed for constitutional changes in order either to limit the power of the religious parties and/or to increase the place of liberal democratic values in the system (Gavison 2006, 369) . Consequently, the constitutional project as a whole progressively became identified with a secular liberal project by the religious groups;
Hence, when a proposition was made in the late 1980s to enact a Basic Law on
Human and Civil Rights, as well as a Basic Law: The Legislation, which would have endowed the superior status of Basic Laws, the religious parties opposed very fiercely to the proposition (Goldberg 1998, 227) . As a result, the promoters of the project rapidly realised that in the present political configuration the constitutional project would be impossible and they focused on the mere idea of a Bill of rights. However, even this appeared as extremely difficult for all attempts to pass a Bill of rights had failed before due to the religious group objection to support a legislation that would possibly challenge the protection of religious specific laws (Kretzmer 1992, 241) 9 . Hence, in 1992, instead of the coherent Bill of rights that was first advocated, the Knesset finally passed two separate Basic Laws on human rights: one related to freedom of occupation and another to human dignity and liberty.
Despite the essential symbolic weight of theses laws and the consequences they would later have (see below), their content was the reflection of a compromise between the government political forces and more specifically, between secular and religious government groups 10 . The first consequence was that the laws anchored only a few specific rights, leaving out fundamental rights like freedom of expression, equality and freedom of religion 11 . The second consequence and clear mark of the compromise was the inclusion of a reference to Israel as a "Jewish and democratic state" 12 . Third, at the demand of religious groups, a clause was added that determined that "Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law"
(section 10). Finally, from the two texts, only the Basic Law related to freedom of 9 After the "constitution failure" in 1950, two propositions to enact a Bill of rights had already been introduced, first in 1964 by the opposition liberal party and then in 1974 by the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee working in the framework of a left-wing coalition. The political configuration between 1984 and 1990 -a unity government between the two big parties with three little parties-could have led to the enactment a constitutional text without the risk of the government dissolution but the fear to lose the religious groups' support in the near future led the large parties to restrain their ambitions to fulfil the constitutional process or even of a Bill of rights enactment. 10 On the explanations of the two Basic Laws vote, see Sapir 2008. 11 The religious parties feared that the recognition of freedom of expression could lead to saction actions offensive to religious sensibilities. See Segal, Zeev, « First a wide consensus, the a constitution », Haaretz, 07/06/1999. 12 Section 1 of the Human right and Dignity law and section 2 of the Freedom of Occupation law.
occupation had an entrenched provision giving it a special status vis-à-vis other laws 13 .
The first draft of the human dignity and liberty law also involved an entrenched provision but it was removed from the text at the second reading for the ultra-orthodox threatened to oppose the law (Sapir 2008, 15) . Moreover, it must be noted that even the entrenchment of the Freedom of Occupation law was not, in the eyes of the legislators, a way to give supra-constitutional status to the law, (Sapir 2008, 15) which explains why religious representatives did not oppose the law. The second failure to enact a Constitution as well as a complete Bill of Rights can thus be understood in the framework of a growing religious vs. secular cleavage in which the religious groups had become opposed to the mere idea of a constitutional project (Goldberg 1998, 227) . As a result, the Bill of rights project was finally turned into two texts of compromise where the religious-secular strains appear very clearly. More generally speaking, the fact that the representative assembly rather than an ad hoc body carried on this process and in a public fashion explains that group interests have prevailed, and especially political strategic interests. On the one hand, the proponent of 13 The entrenchment of the law derives from a provision stating that the law can only be changed by another the Bill might have carried on the process for strategic interests, or the fear to lose a coalition partner -the religious parties-would not have played. On the other, the religious intransigence toward the Bill of rights might have been lessened if the process had been carried on secretly because it would have diminished its fear to lose some of its social basis's support.
The constitution by broad agreement: toward a status quo break?
The failure to enact a Bill of Rights did not put an end to the constitutional dynamic that had emerged in the secular camp. For several years, the dynamic was especially present in the civil, which generated a few constitutional documents 14 . At the same time, the issue was still under discussion in the political arena and in 1999, the Justice Ministry proposed to enact a law entrenching the existing Basic Laws while the Prime Minister was pushing for the writing of an entire constitutional document that would substantively change the polity 15 . In the following government, an expert-committee chaired by a Court justiceYaakov Neeman-was appointed to accelerate the constitution process. A few months later, it presented a Basic Law: Legislation to the Knesset, which was meant to entrench all previous Basic Laws and give them supra-constitutional status (Gavison 2006, 378) .
In parallel, the Constitution, Law and Justice committee resumed the constitution making process with the intention to enact a constitution that would be submit to the public as a referendum 16 
A new constitutional moment?
The Constitution, Law and Justice committee's project has been launched in a specific socio-political configuration that could be seen as a new constitutional moment.
Since In this context, the new constitution making process could be understood as a willingness to reframe the system in order to reconcile the variety of the social segments and to permit the re-establishment of the state's legitimacy on both the religious and the Arab segments. The first element that goes along this interpretation is the proclaimed ideal of the Constitution Committee. Contrarily to the Neeman proposal, the aim of the committee was not to entrench the existing Basic Laws and give them supra-constitutional status, hence entrenching the existing system. On the contrary, the idea was to write a comprehensive "constitution for all" that would satisfy all segments of the society 19 . In effect, this meant a very open constitution making that would be based on the pre-existing Basic Laws but would discuss them for possible alteration.
A second element that confirms this hypothesis is the self-imposed constraints, in which the Committee decided to work. In order to be implemented the "Constitution for all" will indeed have to be ratified both by the Knesset and by the people as a referendum.
Consequently, the committee has decided to invite a series of civil society's members from all segments to take part in the discussions, even though this procedure complicates the formulation of a compromise (Elster 1993 ).
The search for reconciliation interpretation must however been mitigated. Indeed, despite the "Constitution for all" ideal, the constitution will need to be ratified by only a majority of the Knesset and by only a majority of the people indifferently to their social belonging 20 . Thus, the ratification could be concluded without the approval of representative part of the society's segments. Moreover, since the beginning of the process, fierce objections have been pronounced against the constitution making by both ultra-orthodox groups and the Arab segment (Gavison 2006, 379) who have as a result, almost entirely boycotted committee discussions. In spite of this, the committee continued to work and ultimately presented a constitutional document based on these discussions, hence not taking into account these segments' views.
A propitious political configuration?
Another interpretation of the new constitution making could be seen from an opposite perspective, namely, as the result of change in political configuration. As has been seen, the two first constitution failures were in part due to the religious group interests' weight.
Thus the recent development could be explained either by a crucial change in the religious group attitudes or by a diminution of their force. However, neither interpretation seems really convincing.
When the Constitution, Law and Justice committee was demanded to work on the constitutional draft, the religious parties had not changed their position toward a constitutional document. Except from the pragmatically position of the Zionist religious, the other religious groups had even radicalised toward the constitutional project. As for the political weight of the religious groups, a change had obviously occurred in these It is in the context of this institutional struggle, that the constitution making currently taking place must be understood. Indeed, if both propositions to put an end to judicial review have not been completed, neither was the constitutional proposition to institutionalise the present institutional relations (Neeman proposition of 1999). Rather, the only constitution making that has not been rejected by now offers the possibility to deliberate on all constitutional aspects, including the Supreme Court's role and judicial review. Furthermore, this dimension of the project has been made very by the chair of the committee from the very beginning. In his discourse at the opening session of the committee, the chair explained that the need to write a Constitution was urged on "by the activism of the Supreme Court and its steps to legislate a de facto constitution of its own accord" and stressed that "where the court interprets Basic Laws as a constitution set in stone, it infringes on the authority of a legislative branch which never ratified any such constitution" 29 . This issue has then been at the centre of the discussions in the committee and has led to a major alteration of the current system of judicial review in the proposed draft (see below). Hence, the institutional interest interpretation seems at least partially 26 The first decision to void a Knesset law was related to religious issues that had always been protected by the status quo agreement of 1948. convincing in explaining the new move for the new constitution making.
The Constitution for all: what possible outcome?
Even if the process of constitution making is not over yet, the discussions that have been taking place and the constitution draft that has been proposed to the Knesset give an idea of the constitution making possible chance of success.
The main element to be highlighted is that although the discussions have been very different from what had taken place before, the general framework of the constitution making has not been dramatically altered: on the one hand, the constitutional framer is again the parliament, in which both institutional and political interests are at stake, and on the other, the discussions within the committee are more public than they have ever been due to the participatory element that was introduced in the process. This had several implications.
First, the ultra-orthodox groups decided to boycott the constitution making process as a whole 30 . This decision was taken despite the fact that their group interests in redefining the Supreme Court's activity and judicial review were high. The potential discontent of their electorate if they collaborated on a constitution project perceived as mainly secular, in a context of strained secular relations, account for this radical option 31 . Similarly, and contrarily to their usual stance, the majority of the Arab parties and the extreme left party opposed to the process as well. The arguments invoked were the fear that the present constitution making would not do enough for the minority's rights and more largely for basic rights 32 . Hence, instead of trying and influence the process, their anticipation on the outcome pushed them to object the process from the beginning. In fact, it seems that a full involvement in the discussions was seen as too risky in terms of social group support, especially at a time where relationship between the Arab populations and the Jewish State institutions were so bad. Hence the group partially boycotted the discussions and rejected 30 Only one member of the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox party took part to the discussions in order to try and influence the decisions. Yoaz, Yuval, "Experts putting final touches on Israel", Haaretz,, 06/10/2004 31 Ibid. 32 They both claimed that in the present circumstance, the constitution would neither protect minority and human rights nor the role of the judicial review and the Supreme Court that is essential in this perspective.
the draft written by the committee 33 . Under these circumstances, it appears that the committee's document will hardly be enacted in the following years. If it is voted though, then the Knesset will have to sacrifice the "Constitution for all" ideal and hence, there is much doubts over the possibility that the Constitution gets any of the necessary legitimacy it needs. Hence, we can presume that in this context, it is very probable that the quasi-constitutional status quo will endure again for several years.
Conclusion
From the presentation of the Israeli constitution making process, several conclusions can be drawn. First of all, the Israeli case corroborates Elster theory according to which a constitution making led by the elected assembly will aim at defending institutional interests. Institutional interests have been the major cause of the first constitutional failure despite the very propitious moment in which it occurred and it has also been a major element in the third constitution making. It must however be added, that in the Israeli case at least, institutional interests do not coincide with the entire institution's needs but mainly with those of the government parties.
Secondly, as pointed out by Elster, in the framework of a constitution making process carried out by the legislative in a public fashion, discussions will be more complicated.
Indeed, in each of the three constitution making attempts, three types of group interests and perceptions have impeded the constitutional conclusion. First "direct group interests", or the will to guarantee the group privileges as a social and political actor, have played. The religious fear to make concessions on the status quo agreement as the fear of 35 On the other hand however, the Knesset did limit the amendment procedure of the Constitution, hence limiting its future power as an institution the Arab parties to curtail judiciary protection of the minority through curtailment of the Supreme Court's prerogatives are examples of such interest role. Secondly, "strategic group interests" have been dominant: the fear to be deprived of a part of its electorate can lead a group to oppose or adhere to a constitution making when it is a public process.
This was for example the case of the religious ultra-orthodox groups after the increasing prevalence of the secular vs. religious cleavage, who decided to take a radical stance on the constitution making despite the direct interests they could have had in influencing the constitutional process. Another kind of strategic interest that has been present was related to the calculation of the possible loss in coalition partners. This was especially true in regard to the human rights Basic Laws when the secular chose to reach a compromise with the religious. Third and more generally speaking, it appears that correspondingly to Lusztig's assertion, constitution making carried on by the representative assembly in deeply divided societies is highly complicated. If the first constitution making could have succeeded but was impeded by mostly institutional interests, the cleavages' deepening that occurred over the years both between religious and secular and between Arabs and Jews had considerable consequences on the capacity of the legislative to reach a compromise. While during the first constitution making, all groups took part in discussions, leading to a compromise between them all, the current constitutional process has been carried on without three major segments of the socio-political arena -the ultraorthodox, the Arab minority and the extreme left. Hence, such a constitution making model, if it finally leads to a Constitution will be incapable to create the necessary legitimacy that such a document requires. In conclusion, it appears from the Israeli analysis, that the wish to conclude a constitutional process in deeply divided society is even more dependent than other types of societies on the very procedures they use in their constitution making process.
36 See Knesset Protocols 13/02/2006
